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Making inference under uncertainty requires an optimal weighting of prior expectations
and observations. How this weighting is realized in the brain remains elusive. To investi-
gate this, we recorded functional neuroimaging data while participants estimated a
number based on noisy observations. Crucially, the prior expectation about the variability
of observations (an expected variability) was manipulated. Consistent with normative
models, when novel observations were characterized by higher expected or observed
variability, participants' estimates relied more on expectations than novel observations
and were characterized by higher stochasticity. Activity in hippocampus increased when
novel evidence was characterized by higher expected or observed variability. Response in
superior parietal cortex reflected a precision-weighted prediction error signal (i.e., the
distance between observations and expectations) that was modulated by hippocampal
activity. Our findings implicate the hippocampus during inference under uncertainty,
suggesting a role in weighting prior representations over observations and in modulating
responsivity of superior parietal cortex to prediction error.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In daily life, we often face situations that require inference
based on ambiguous or noisy sensory data, a form of inference
under uncertainty (Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006; Clark,
2013a, 2013b; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Vilares & Kording,
2011). A paradigmatic example is driving a car in the fog,
which requires veridical inference about key states of affairseondon, Northampton Squ
k (F. Rigoli).
d by Elsevier Ltd. Thissuch as the trajectory of the road or inferred speed of the
vehicle e from a noisy or imprecise visual input. A key aspect
of such inference under uncertainty is an integration of prior
knowledge and incoming sensory evidence. During estima-
tion of a continuous variable from noisy observations,
different forms of prior information can be considered. One of
these is expected value, which is associated with a prior un-
certainty reflecting confidence in an expectation. Another is
the expected variability of upcoming sensory evidence. Forare, London EC1V 0HB, UK.
is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
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size based on data derived from one particular area, knowl-
edge of similar cities can inform prior beliefs on such
variability. This expected variability can then be integratedwith
data, or observed variability, to estimate a posterior belief about
the buildings' variability.
Prior studieshave primarily focused on themanipulation of
expected value and its uncertainty, where an influential body
of work proposes these quantities are treated in a manner
consistent with optimal (or Bayesian) inference (Chater et al.,
2006; Clark, 2013a, 2013b; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Vilares
& Kording, 2011). Substantial empirical evidence now sup-
ports this notion (Bu¨chel, Geuter, Sprenger, & Eippert, 2014;
Berniker & Kording, 2008; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Harris &
Wolpert, 1998; Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Knill &
Richards, 1996; Kording & Wolpert, 2004; 2006; Jazayeri &
Shadlen, 2010; Petzschner, Glasauer, & Stephan, 2015;
Summerfield & De Lange, 2014; Summerfield & Egner, 2009;
Trommershauser, Kording, & Landy, 2011, 2003, 2008;
Todorov, 2004; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995; Zelano,
Mohanty, & Gottfried, 2011). However, the role of prior ex-
pectations regarding variability in upcoming sensory data re-
mains poorly understood and it remainsunclear how the brain
processes expectations about variability during inference.
Here, we investigated the integration of expected and
observed variability during inference by characterising the
associated cognitive and neural processes. We devised a new
taskwhere participants are asked to infer the value of a number
based on both prior information and noisy observations. To test
key predictions of an optimal inference hypothesis, we
manipulated (i) the expected value of the number, (ii) the ex-
pected variability of observations, and (iii) the actual variability
of observations. This enabled us to examine the influence of
expected and observed variability on an estimation of the num-
ber. Theoretical models of optimal inference predict that ob-
servations with high expected or observed variability should be
considered as less reliable (Chater et al., 2006; Clark, 2013a,
2013b; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Vilares & Kording, 2011).
Hence, with less reliable observations, the number estimated
by participants should be closer to the expected value than to
the value indicated by a novel observation. Additionally, less
reliable observations should also increase response stochas-
ticity, i.e., the variability of participants' estimates.
Using functional neuroimaging, we recorded participants'
brain activity during task performance to elucidate important
aspects of inference that remain poorly understood.We asked
how the brain realizes a weighting of expectations over ob-
servations, which prescribes how much one should rely on
prior information compared to upcoming and novel sensory
evidence. Specifically, a region involved in weighting expec-
tations over observations was predicted to show enhanced
activity for both higher expected and observed variability. In
addition, we also examined how the brain represents predic-
tion error (PE; i.e., the distance between observations and
expectations), which is another important quantity that
guides inference. Finally, we explored the relationship be-
tween neural processes linked with weighting expectations
over observations and neural processes linked with PE
signalling. As suggested by some theoretical proposals
(Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999), a possibility is that regionsweighting expectations over observations would modulate
activity in regions reflecting PE.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Thirty-three healthy right-handed adults (18 females and 15
males, aged 20e40, mean age 27) participated in the experi-
ment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. None had history of head injury, a diagnosis of any
neurological or psychiatric condition, or was currently on
medication affecting the central nervous system. The study
was approved by the University College of London Research
Ethics Committee. All participants provided written informed
consent and were paid £40 for participating.
2.2. Experimental paradigm and procedure
During MRI, participants performed a computer-based task
lasting approximately 40 min (Fig. 1), which required esti-
mating the value of numbers based on prior information and
on noisy observations. The task was based on a cover story,
whereby participants estimated the amount of fuel in the tank
of a motorbike by reporting a number between 10 and 25 L.
Participants were instructed that motorbikes were equipped
with two gauges, each providing an independent reading of the
fuel amount. On each trial (there were 480 trials overall), par-
ticipants observed the numbers reported by the gauges (g1 and
g2, both between 10 and 25 L). Before these numbers appeared,
information was provided on the top of the computer screen
about (i) the amount of fuel usually present in the motorbike
tank (either 15 or 20 L), corresponding to an expected value, and
(ii) the usual variability of the gauges (either low or high), cor-
responding to expected variability. The latter was described to
participants as the accuracy of the gauges, with high accuracy
corresponding to low expected variability, and low accuracy
corresponding to high expected variability. One second after
presentation of prior information, the two numbers g1and g2
were presented. These were characterized by an observed vari-
ability, in other words numbers that were very close together
resulted in a low observed variability, while numbers that were
far apart were indicative of a high observed variability.
The prior information (expected value and expected vari-
ability) given to participants was reliable, with the true fuel
amount selected randomly from a distribution with an
average corresponding to the expected value, and where the
distance between g1 and g2 was on average larger for trials
with high compared to low expected variability. Specifically,
for each trial the true fuel amount m was randomly drawn
from a Gaussian distribution with mean equal to either 15 or
20 (i.e., the expected value), and SD equal to 3. The quantities
reported by the gauges corresponded to two numbers g1 and
g2 independently drawn from a Gaussian distribution with
mean m and SD equal to 4 during low expected variability
trials, and equal to 7 during high expected variability trials.
The values of m, g1 or g2 were rounded to the nearest integers,
and if one of themwas larger than 25 or smaller than 10, it was
assigned the closest between 25 and 10.
Fig. 1 e Illustration of the task paradigm. Participants
estimated the amount of fuel present in the tank of a
motorbike by reporting a number between 10 and 25 L.
Participants were told that motorbikes were equipped with
two gauges, each providing an independent reading of the
fuel amount. For one second, information was provided on
the top of the computer screen about (i) the amount of fuel
usually present in the motorbike tank (either 15 or 20 L), (ii)
the expected variability of the gauges (either low or high).
The latter was described to participants as the accuracy of
the gauges (Acc), with high accuracy (High Acc)
corresponding to low expected variability, and low
accuracy (Low Acc) corresponding to high expected
variability. Next, two numbers (e.g., 18 and 24) were
presented, each indicating the fuel reported by one gauge.
At this time, participants could indicate their inferred fuel
amount (e.g., 18), and 300 msec after choice feedback on
the true fuel amount (e.g., 15) was provided for one second.
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appeared, participants could indicate their inferred fuel
amount by selecting a number between 10 and 25 using a
keypad to move a cursor on a scale. The keypad included one
button for moving the cursor left and another button for
moving the cursor right, plus a button to finalize the choice.
300 msec after the choice was finalized, feedback on the true
fuel amount was provided, as the corresponding number on
the scale turned red for one second, and a new trial started
immediately after.
A newmotorbike was presented on each trial. However, to
facilitate processing of prior information, the task was orga-
nized in blocks, each with 5 consecutive trials presenting
motorbikes characterized by the same expected fuel amount
and the same expected variability level. Before a new block
started, the statement “New set” appeared for two seconds.
Block order was pseudo-random, and an equal number of
trials was presented for each condition of usual fuel amount
and of expected variability.
Participants were tested at the Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging at the University College London. Before scan-
ning, they were fully instructed about the task and played 120trials, ensuring they familiarized with task statistics. This
was aimed at minimizing any influence of learning, hence
isolating the computational and neural processes underlying
inference. This allowed us to focus specifically on how the
brain realizes inference based on prior knowledge which has
been previously acquired through learning. Inside the scan-
ner, participants performed the task in four separate sessions
(each including 120 trials), followed by a 12 min structural
scan. After scanning, participantswere debriefed and received
a remuneration of £40 for participating.2.3. fMRI scanning and analysis
The task was programmed using the Cogent toolbox (Well-
come Trust Centre for Neuroimaging) in Matlab. Visual stimuli
were back projected onto a translucent screen positioned
behind the bore of the magnet and viewed via an angled
mirror. Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast
functional images were acquired with echo-planar T2*-
weighted (EPI) imaging using a Siemens Trio 3-Tesla MR sys-
tem with a 32 channel head coil. The whole brain was covered
by images comprising 48 interleaved 3-mm-thick sagittal slices
(in-plane resolution ¼ 3  3 mm; time to echo ¼ 30 msec;
repetition time ¼ 3.36 sec). The first six volumes were dis-
carded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. T1-weighted
structural images were acquired at a 1  1  1 mm resolu-
tion. Functional MRI data were analyzed using Statistical
Parametric Mapping (SPM) version 12 (Wellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging). Data preprocessing included spatial
realignment, unwarping using individual field maps, slice
timing correction, normalization and smoothing. Specifically,
functional volumes were realigned to the mean volume, were
spatially normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) template with a 3  3  3 voxel size, and were
smoothed with 8mmGaussian kernel. High-pass filteringwith
a cut-off of 128 sec and AR(1)-model were applied.
We characterised the neural processes underlying the
weighting of prior expectations and observations during
inference. Specifically, we probed brain activity as a function
of expected and observed variability, and in relation to
expression of a PE. Hemodynamic responses were modelled
with a canonical hemodynamic response function and a GLM
including, when the two numbers indicated by the gauges g1
and g2 were presented, one stick function regressor for high
expected variability trials and another stick function regressor
for low expected variability trials. Each was modulated (i) by
the PE signal equal to PE ¼ m mg, namely the distance be-
tween the prior mean m (either 15 or 20 L) and the observation
mean mg (corresponding to mg ¼ ðg1 þ g2Þ=2), (ii) by the
observed variability vg equal to vg ¼
g1  g2, namely the
distance between the numbers indicated by the gauges, and
(iii) by the RT associated with the participant's response
measured from the gauge onset as nuisance parametric
modulator. For the GLM estimation, the parametric regressors
weremean-rescaled except for observed variability. The latter
variable was not demeaned for the following reason. Mathe-
matically, a stick function regressor (such as the one for high
expected variability or the one for low expected variability)
reflects the predicted response when its associated
c o r t e x 1 1 5 ( 2 0 1 9 ) 1e1 44parametric modulators (e.g., PE and observed variability) are
equal to zero. By design, high and low expected variability
trials were matched with respect to PE, but they were not
matchedwith respect to observed variability. This because, by
design, high expected variability trials were, on average,
associated with higher observed variability. Therefore, if in
the GLM the observed variability was rescaled to the mean
(separately for high expected variability and low expected
variability), then, when comparing high versus low expected
variability trials, the same rescaled observed variability levels
would correspond to different raw observed variability levels.
A consequence of this would be a bias when comparing high
versus low expected variability. This bias can be avoided by
considering the raw, and not the demeaned, observed vari-
ability, an approach we followed in our GLM.
The GLM included other regressors; specifically (i) one stick
function regressor at feedback timemodulated by the distance
between the feedback number and the number chosen by the
participant, (ii) a box-car function regressor at the time when
the first button of the keypad was pressed, with a duration
defined by the time when the response was finalized, (iii) 6
movement and 17 physiological (derived from breathing and
heart rate signals) nuisance regressors. TheGLMwas estimated
separately for each session of the task (see Table S1 for infor-
mation about the collinearity among regressors of the GLM,
showing that there are no issues of collinearity in the GLM).
Contrasts of interest were computed subject by subject, and
used for second-level (between subjects) one-sample t-tests
using standard summary statistic approach (Holmes & Friston,
1998). To establish which brain region to focus on for exploring
how expectations are weighted over observations, we consid-
ered two criteria. First, activation in a region reflecting the
weighting of expectations over observations should increase
when novel evidence is less reliable, corresponding in our task
to trials having higher expected or observed variability. Second,
we were interested in regions potentially recruited when ab-
stract quantities are involved, and for this purpose we adopted
a task in which an abstract variable was manipulated. Given
these two criteria (i.e., the predicted neural activation and the
focus on an abstract task), we investigated the weighting of
expectations over observations focusing on the hippocampus,
for the following reasons. First, it has been shown that activity
in this region is sensitive to the entropy of a stimulus stream
(Harrison, Duggins, & Friston, 2006; Strange, Duggins, Penny,
Dolan, & Friston, 2005; Tobia, Iacovella, & Hasson, 2012),
which is analogous to observed variability in our task. This
raises the question of whether response in hippocampus in-
creases also for expected, in addition to observed, variability, as
implicated by an encoding of a weight of expectations over
observations. Second, a large body of evidence indicates that
hippocampal engagement is not bound to any specific sensory
modality, and occurs when abstract variables are involved
(Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; McNaughton & Nadel, 1990; Rolls &
Treves, 1998). This is in line with the possibility that this re-
gion could play a role in our abstract task. Third, although
previous evidence indicates that observed variability of novel
evidence affects activity also in other regions such as the oc-
cipital cortex (Vilares, Howard, Fernandes, Gottfried,&Kording,
2012), these are sensory-specific areaswhich are less likely to be
recruited when abstract quantities are manipulated. For thesereasons, we focused on the hippocampus as a candidate
structure for encoding the weight of expectations over obser-
vations during an abstract task.
Regarding the question of how PE is represented in the
brain, evidence fromneuroimaging studies (Strange et al., 2005;
O'Reilly, Schu¨ffelgen, Cuell, Behrens, Mars,& Rushworth, 2013;
O'Reilly, Jbabdi, Rushworth, & Behrens, 2013), as well as a
recent computationalmodel (O'Reilly, Schu¨ffelgen, et al., 2013),
proposes that the superior parietal cortex (SPC) is critical for
processing surprise (indicating howmuch a new observation is
informative). When a continuous variable is manipulated such
as in our task, surprise is mathematically equivalent to a
precision-weighted PE, in other words to a PE multiplied by its
precision (the precision of a variable is the inverse of its vari-
ance or uncertainty; see below). This raises the question of
whether a precision-weighted PE is signalled within SPC.
For these reasons, statistical (small volume corrected e
SVC) tests focused on the hippocampus and the SPC as
pre-defined ROIs for the group. For hippocampus, we relied on
the pre-defined hippocampal anatomical mask available in
the AAL structural ROI archive provided by the MarsBar
toolbox (for details on how this mask was derived, see
Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Previous literature indicates the
anterior hippocampal portion is particularly involved in nov-
elty processing. Given our specific interest in this portion, we
split the hippocampalmask relative to the vertical axis andwe
included only voxels with z < 14 in our final hippocampal
ROI. The specific portion of the SPC which have been linked
with processing surprise (O'Reilly, Jbabdi, et al., 2013) has been
labelled as area IPS3 (Mars et al., 2011) or area 7 A (Scheperjans
et al., 2008). Similar to O'Reilly, Jbabdi, et al. (2013), our ROI
corresponded to an 8 mm sphere centred on a priori co-
ordinates extracted from a recent diffusion-imaging parcel-
lation study on this portion of SPC (Mars et al., 2011; ±15, 63,
53). Statistics of ROIs were SVC using a family wise error (FWE)
rate of p < .05 as the significance threshold. For exploratory
purposes, we also report data for other brain regions with
statistics having p < .001 uncorrected significance (Table S2).3. Results
3.1. Behaviour
We analysed how participants inferred the fuel amount and
asked whether this was consistent with predictions derived
from optimal inference (for additional analyses of reaction
times (RTs) see SI). A first prediction is that the higher the
expected variability, the closer subjects' estimates should be
to the expected value, relative to the mean of the gauges, i.e.,
the average observed value. Second, when gauges report
numbers that are far from each other, thereby increasing
observed variability, subjects' estimates should be closer to
the expected value relative to the observation mean (and vice
versawhen gauge numbers are close to each other). Finally, we
tested implications of optimal inference for the stochasticity
of participants' estimates. Specifically, we asked whether the
degree of stochasticity (i.e. response variability) remained
constant or e as predicted by optimal inference e it increased
with both expected and observed variability.
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whether expected and observed variability influence the posi-
tion of participant's response R relative to the expected value m
(either 15 or 20 L) and to the observed mean of the gauges
mg(equal to mg ¼ ðg1 þ g2Þ=2). As dependent variable of the
regression model, we considered y ¼ jR  mgj  jR  mj, which is
positive if participant's response is closer to the expected value
than to the observedmean, and negative otherwise. Themodel
included expected variability (high expected variability was
coded as one and low expected variability as zero) and observed
variability as predictors (see SI for analyses on a regression
model includingalsopredictors basedonprevious trials).Across
participants, the regressioncoefficientassociatedwithexpected
variability was significantly larger than zero (t(32) ¼ 12.06,
p < .001), indicating that, with higher expected variability,
response was closer to the expected value than the observed
mean. The regression coefficient associated with observed
variability was also significantly positive ((t(32)¼ 3.58, p ¼ .001),
indicating that response was closer to the expected value than
the observed mean when the observed variability was higher.
Next, to assess predictions of optimal inference theory
more formally, and to explore any impact on choice stochas-
ticity, we adopted a model-based approach. We assumed that
participants estimated the volume of fuel in the motorbike
tank under a generative model based on optimal inference
principles (adapted from a Bayesian model; see Appendix).
First, the generative model calculates a posterior belief about
the fuel bm that corresponds to a weighted average between the
expected value m (either 15 or 20 L) and the observation mean
mg(equal to mg ¼ ðg1 þ g2Þ=2):
bm ¼ wmg þ ð1wÞm (1)
The parameter w reflects the weight of the observation
mean mg relative to the expected value m and can vary between
zero and one. Aw>0:5 implies that the posterior belief will be
closer to the observationmean than the expected value, while
a w<0:5 implies the opposite (w ¼ 0:5 implies an equal
distance). According to optimal inference (see Methods), the
weight w varies as a function of the expected and observed
variability. A simple way to quantify the latter is calculating
the distance between gauges, namely vg ¼
g1  g2. This im-
plies that the closer the numbers indicated by the gauges, the
lower the observed variability. After z-scoring vg and calcu-
lating v'g (which thus has mean equal to zero and SD equal to
one), the weight w on each trial is dependent on a sigmoid
function of expected and observed variability:
w ¼ sigs;s'o ¼ 1
1þ evþagv'g
(2)
This formulation is adapted from a Bayesian model (see
Methods). The use of a sigmoid function ensures that the
weightw is constrained between zero and one. The parameter
v reflects an effect of the expected variability and corresponds
to vL during low expected variability trials and to vH during
high expected variability trials. This equation includes three
free parameters, namely a parameter for low expected vari-
ability trials vL, a parameter for high expected variability trials
vH, and a parameter ag which captures the effect of the
z-scored observed variability v'g.In addition, the generative model assumes stochasticity in
a participant's response R, which is drawn from a Gaussian
distribution having an average equal to the posterior belief bm
and a SD equal to uþ bgv'g:
R  N
bm;uþ bgv'g2 (3)
The parameter u reflects an effect of expected variability
on response stochasticity and corresponds to uL during low
expected variability trials and to uH during high expected
variability trials. This equation includes three additional free
parameters. These are the parameters related to expected
variability uL anduH, plus the parameter bg which captures the
effect of the z-scored observed variability v'g on stochasticity.
During parameter estimation, these free parameters were
constrained in such a way to ensure that the overall SD of the
Gaussian distribution was positive (see Appendix).
Altogether, the full model of behavioural responses
included six free parameters (vL, vH, ag, uL, uH and bg) esti-
mated individually from each participant's behavioural data.
To assess the validity of this model, we compared it with a
baselinemodelModelbase in which behavioural responses were
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with fixed mean and SD.
As a more stringent test, the full model was also compared
with four simpler models that were equivalent to the full
model except for one of the following simplifications: (i) for
Modelv, vL was constrained to be equal to vH; (ii) for Modela, ag
was fixed to zero; (iii) forModelu,uLwas constrained to be equal
to uH; (iv) for Modelb, bg was fixed to zero.
For each model of the behavioural data, we estimated the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which reports the
goodness of amodel in termsof an accuracy/complexity trade-
off (i.e., an approximation to negative log model evidence).
After summing the BIC scores across subjects for each model,
we found that the full model had the lowest BIC score (i.e.,
highest evidence), indicating that this model outperformed
simpler models in characterizing participants' behaviour
(Table 1). To assess the reliability of the parameters estimated
with the full model, for each participant we randomly split the
trials in two sets, and estimated the parameters separately for
each set. For all parameters, a significant positive correlation
between the two setswas observed across participants (Fig. S1;
vL: r(31) ¼ .63, p < .001; vH: r(31) ¼ .77, p < .001; ag: r(31) ¼ .39,
p ¼ .026; uH : r(31) ¼ .82, p < .001; uL: r(31) ¼ .93, p < .001; bg:
r(31) ¼ .60, p < .001; two-tailed alpha of .05 was used as sig-
nificance criterion for behavioural analyses). Altogether, these
analyses support the validity and reliability of the full model
(see SI for further analyses based on simulated data).
We then used the full model to test the predictions derived
from the optimal inference hypothesis outlined above. First
(Prediction one), the value of vH will be larger than the value of
vL (Fig. 2A). This implies that the weight w was larger with vL
than with vH, entailing that the posterior belief was closer
to the observation mean than the expected value in low
compared to high expected variability trials. This prediction
was supported by our results, where we observed a larger
value for vH compared to vL across participants (Fig. 2B;
t(32) ¼ 5.81, p < .001). A second prediction (Prediction two) was
that ag would be larger than zero (Fig. 2C). This indicates the
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v'g e implying that the posterior belief was closer to the
expected value than to the observation mean with higher
z-scored observed variability v'g. Our results were consistent
with this prediction, as ag was significantly larger than zero
across participants (Fig. 2D; t(32) ¼ 2.18, p ¼ .037). Third (Pre-
diction three), we predicted that the value of uH would be larger
than the value of uL, implying a higher stochasticity during
high compared to low expected variability trials (Fig. 2E). Data
supported this, showing a larger value for uHcompared to uL
(Fig. 2F; t(32) ¼ 4.73, p < .001). Finally (Prediction four), a value
larger than zero was predicted for bg, implying a higher sto-
chasticity for higher z-scored observed variability v'g (Fig. 2G).
This accorded with our observation of a value of bg that was
significantly larger than zero across participants (Fig. 2F;
t(32) ¼ 8.26, p < .001). Given our focus on inference and not on
learning, we predicted the effects tested here to remain stable
along the task, and our analyses comparing the first versus
second half of the task confirmed this prediction (see SI).
In sum, our behavioural analyses were consistent with
predictions derived from optimal inference, highlighting a
dual role for both expected and observed variability. The first
role implies the expected value is relied upon more under
higher expected and observed variability. The second role
implies that stochasticity increases with both expected and
observed variability. Intuitively, if the observed and expected
variability did not impact on choice stochasticity, a partici-
pant's estimate would correspond to the posterior belief plus
some error, but the error term would be fixed. In other words,
the brain would first rely on expected value and gauges to
infer the posterior belief, corresponding to a single point es-
timate, and next it would sample from a distribution with a
fixed variance centred on the posterior estimate. On the con-
trary, our results support the notion that observed and ex-
pected variability affect choice stochasticity, in other words
that the brain samples froma distribution tuned to the current
expected and observed variability.
3.2. Neuroimaging
We characterised the neural processes underlying the
weighting of prior expectations and observations during
inference. Specifically, we analysed brain activity in ourTable 1 e Results of the model comparison analysis. The first
descriptions). The second column lists the free parameters of
likelihood of the data (summed across subjects). The fourth co
quantifying the improvement afforded by a model compared t
well the model fits the data. This quantity is bounded between
fifth column reports the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; s
how many subjects each model showed the lowest BIC score am
model had the lowest BIC).
Model Free parameters Neg Log-Lik
Full Model vL, vH, ag, uL, uH, bg 27280
Modelv v, ag, uL, uH, bg 27543
Modela vL, vH, uL, uH, bg 27353
Modelu vL, vH, ag, u, bg 27498
Modelb vL, vH, ag, uL, uH 27678
Modelbase m;SD 34713regions of interest (ROIs) e comprising the hippocampus and
SPC e as a function of expected and observed variability, and
in relation to expression of a PE (seeMethods).We fitted a GLM
having, at the time when the two numbers indicated by the
gauges g1 and g2 appeared, a stick function regressor for high
expected variability trials and another for low expected vari-
ability trials. Each was modulated by observed variability vg
equal to vg ¼
g1  g2 (i.e., the distance between the numbers
indicated by the gauges). A second parametric modulator was
a PE equal to PE ¼ jm  mg
, namely, the distance between the
expected value m (either 15 or 20 L) and the observation mean
mg(noting that mg ¼ ðg1þ g2Þ=2).
When assessing the influence of expected variability, we
observed an increased response for high compared to low
expected variability in left hippocampus (Fig. 3; 21, 7, 20;
Z ¼ 3.58, p ¼ .009 SVC; Montreal Neurological Institute co-
ordinates were used) but not right hippocampus nor SPC
(p > .05 SVC). Note that this contrast is not biased by any
difference in observed variability between the two conditions,
as observed variability vg was not rescaled to the mean within
the GLM (see Methods). When we examined the GLM beta
parameter associated with the observed variability vg we
found this was significantly greater than zero in bilateral
hippocampi (Fig. 3; left: 21, 10, 20; Z ¼ 4.10, p ¼ .002 SVC;
right: 21, 13, 17; Z ¼ 3.51, p ¼ .011 SVC) but not in SPC.
Finally, we found that the beta parameter associated with a PE
was significantly positive in bilateral SPC (Fig. 4; left: 9, 64,
49; Z¼ 3.25, p¼ .025 SVC; right: 9,61, 52; Z¼ 3.23, p¼ .026) but
not in the hippocampus.
We used our computational model of behaviour to probe
these results further. With a simple algebraic transformation,
we can rewrite equation (1) as:






This shows that the posterior belief is equal to the expected
value plus the difference between the observation mean mg
and the expected value mmultiplied by theweightw. Note that
this equation resembles a standard Rescorla-Wagner rule
(Friston, 2005; Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston, & Stephan, 2011;
Rigoli, Friston, Martinelli, Selakovic, Shergill, & Dolan, 2016).
From equation (2), we know thatw corresponds to the relative
weight of the observation mean, as it decreases with thecolumn reports the model considered (see main text for
each model. The third column reports the negative log-
lumn reports the pseudo-r2(Daw, 2011) which, by
o a baseline model (in our case, Modelbase), indicates how
zero and one, with larger values indicating a better fit. The
ummed across subjects). The sixth column indicates for
ongst the models considered (e.g., for 22 subjects the full







Fig. 2 e Effects predicted by the optimal inference hypothesis and their test. A: Prediction one, whereby the value of the
parameter vH was expected to be larger than the value of vL (red horizontal lines indicates means; red vertical lines indicate
standard errors). B: Data for prediction one, where blue dots indicate parameter values for individual participants
(t(32)¼ 5.81, p < .001). C: Prediction two, whereby the value of the parameter ag was expected to be larger than zero. D: Data
for prediction two (t(32) ¼ 2.18, p ¼ .037). E: Prediction three, whereby the value of the parameter uL was expected to be
larger than the value of uH. F: Data for prediction three (t(32) ¼ 4.73, p < .001). G: Prediction four, whereby the value of the
parameter bg was expected to be larger than zero. H: Data for prediction four (t(32) ¼ 8.26, p < .001).
c o r t e x 1 1 5 ( 2 0 1 9 ) 1e1 4 7expected variability vand with the z-scored observed vari-
ability v'g. Equation four allows one to define a precision-
weighted prediction error PEw as:
PEw¼def




This is the precision-weighted distance between the
observation mean and the expected value, in other words a
quantification of how much a belief should change after
new observations. Crucially, this is formally analogous to
the construct of surprise, as it quantifies how surprising
observations are (Friston, 2005). Note that the surprise de-
pends upon the quality of the observations. In other words,
unreliable observations are less surprising than reliable
observations.
Considering equations (4) and (5), the fMRI results raise the
following questions: (i) do responses in SPC reflect a PE or a
precision-weighted PE signal? (ii) Do left hippocampus re-
sponses reflect the weight of the expected value, which
formally corresponds to the opposite of the weightw or to ð1
wÞ? This possibility is consistent with the increased response
with expected and observed variability found in hippocampus
in the previous analysis. (iii) Does activity in hippocampus
modulate the responsivity (or gain) in SPC to PE?
To answer the first question, we reasoned that a precision-
weighted PE would predict a stronger relationship between PE
and SPC activity under low compared to high expected vari-
ability. We tested this prediction by comparing the beta
parameter for PE for lowminus high expected variability trials
and consistent with our hypothesis we found a significant
difference in bilateral SPC (Fig. 4; left: 9, 58, 52; Z ¼ 3.17,
p ¼ .030 SVC; right: 9, 55, 55; Z ¼ 3.57, p ¼ .010).To address the second question, we fitted a second GLM
equal to the previous one except that a single stick function
regressor was included when g1 and g2 appeared, in this case
modulated by the expression vþ agv'g, (i.e., the weight 1w
without the sigmoid transformation) and by RTs as a nuisance
parametric modulator. For calculating vþ agv'g, we used the
computationalmodel of behaviour to estimate the parameters
vL, vH, and ag. Following Wilson and Niv (2015), for these
parameters we used the same values for all subjects, corre-
sponding to the mean parameter scores (to ascertain that our
results did not depend on this approach, we also performed
the same analysis except that individual parameter scores
were used for vL, vH, and ag; similar results were obtained (not
shown)). The GLM beta parameter associated with vþ agv'g
was significantly positive in left hippocampus (21, 7, 17;
Z¼ 4.56, p < .001 SVC). In other words, hippocampal responses
were greater when observations had higher expected and
observed variability, consistent with the notion that the hip-
pocampus encodes the relative weight of the expected over
the observed value.
We investigated the connectivity between hippocampus
and SPC, examining whether the hippocampusmodulates the
responsivity e or gain e in SPC to a PE (Fig. 4). To test this, we
performed a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis
(based on the first GLM), using the left hippocampus as
(physiological) seed region (specifically, the voxel with co-
ordinates 21, 7, 17, which showed the peak activation in
the analysis based on the second GLM for the expression vþ
agv'g) and the PE as the experimental (psychological) condi-
tion. A significant negative interaction (i.e., PPI) parameter
was observed in right SPC (Fig. 4; 15, 61, 55; Z ¼ 3.54, p ¼ .011
SVC; all voxels showed p > .05 SVC in left SPC), indicating a
Fig. 3 e fMRI results about the effect of expected and observed variability in the hippocampus. A: Voxels activated at p < .001
uncorrected (these are shown for display purposes only) are displayed in red for the effect of expected variability and in
yellow for the effect of observed variability. The brain image corresponds to the mean structural image of participants. B:
Value of the high versus low expected variability contrast in the peak activation voxel of left hippocampus (L Hip; ¡21, ¡7,
¡20; Z ¼ 3.58, p ¼ .009 SVC; Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates were used)). The horizontal red line indicates the
average across participants, the vertical red line indicates the standard error, and the blue dots indicate values for individual
participants. C: Value of the GLM beta parameter relative to the observed variability in the peak activation voxel of left
hippocampus (¡21, ¡10, ¡20; Z ¼ 4.10, p ¼ .002 SVC). D: Activation in left hippocampus (¡21, ¡10, ¡20) for different levels
of observed variability. These were obtained based on a GLM where observed variability was ordered in three bins of equal
numericity, and where each bin was associated with a stick function regressor. This GLM was estimated for display
purposes only, and was not used for statistical testing.
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activity in the left hippocampus was lower. Although alter-
native interpretations cannot be excluded, this finding is in
line with our hypothesis that an hippocampal encoding of the
weight of expectation modulates a responsivity of SPC to
PE. In summary, these results suggest that hippocampal
activation depends on the expected and observed reliability of
evidence, and modulates the sensitivity of SPC to PEs.
We examined the time of feedback by exploring neural
activity related with outcome PE (corresponding to the dis-
tance between the feedback number and the number chosen
by the participant). A positive relationship was evident be-
tween outcome PE and activity in bilateral SPC (left: 9, 58,
49; Z ¼ 4.42, p < .001 SVC; right: 9, 58, 52; Z ¼ 5.52, p < .001
SVC). This indicates that SPC processes information related
with PE also at feedback. Interestingly, adopting whole-brain
correction, an inverse relationship emerged between
outcome PE and activity in ventral striatum (left: 12, 11, 2;
Z ¼ 6.74, p < .001 whole-brain corrected; right: 9, 11, 5;
Z ¼ 6.69, p < .001 whole-brain corrected). The latter region is
important for reward processing, as for instance substantial
evidence shows that activity in this region reflects how mucha reward is better than expected (e.g., Glimcher, 2011). In our
task, it is reasonable to assume that participants were
rewardedmore when their response was closer to the number
revealed, which is consistent with the observation of an in-
verse correlation between ventral striatum and outcome PE.
Interestingly, recent studies have supported the possibil-
ity that the amygdala also contributes to aspects of novelty
processing (Balderston et al., 2001; Schwartz, Wright, Shin,
Kagan, & Rauch, 2003). Hence, for exploratory purposes, we
asked whether the effects of observed and expected vari-
ability could be found in the amygdala too. We defined
amygdala using the anatomical mask available in the Mars-
Bar AAL archive (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). An effect
associated with expected variability emerged in left, but not
right, amygdala (21, 7, 17; T ¼ 3.76, p < .001 uncorrected;
given the exploratory nature of this analysis, p < .001 un-
corrected was used a threshold), though no effect associated
with observed variability was evident (these results were
confirmed also when the analyses were re-run using a 4 mm
smoothing kernel (data not shown)). This hints to the pos-
sibility that the amygdala partially contributes to processing
expectations about variability. Note that our hippocampal
Fig. 4 e fMRI results about the effects emerged in superior parietal cortex (SPC). A: Voxels activated at p < .001 uncorrected
(shown for display purposes only) are displayed in red for the effect of prediction error (PE; calculated as the distance
between the expected value and the observation mean, namely PE ¼ jm - mg
), in yellow for the contrast comparing PE
response during low compared to high expected variability, and in green for the PPI analysis having left hippocampus as
seed region and having PE as psychological condition. The brain image corresponds to the mean structural image of
participants. B: fMRI results for the beta parameter associated with PE when comparing low versus high expected variability
trials in the peak activation voxel of SPC (9, ¡55, 55; Z ¼ 3.57, p ¼ .010). The beta parameters are plotted separately for low
expected variability (Low Exp Var) and high expected variability (High Exp Var) trials. Horizontal red lines indicate averages
across participants, vertical red lines indicate the standard error, and blue dots indicate values for individual participants. C:
Activation in the peak activation voxel of left SPC (¡9, ¡64, 49; Z ¼ 3.25, p ¼ .025 SVC) for different levels of PE. These were
obtained based on a GLMwhere PE was ordered in three bins of equal numericity, and where each bin was associated with a
stick function regressor. This GLM was estimated for display purposes only, and was not used for statistical testing. D:
Scheme of the hypothetical neural circuit involved in our task, where (i) the hippocampus implements the weight of the
expected value as its activity increases with expected variability v and observed variability vg, (ii) the SPC response reflects
PE, (iii) the hippocampus modulates the responsivity of SPC to PE, as stronger hippocampal response attenuates the
responsivity. The latter element of the circuit was examined with the PPI analysis. E: PPI effect in the peak activation voxel
of right SPC (15, ¡61, 55; Z ¼ 3.54, p ¼ .011 SVC).
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mutually exclusive, meaning that each voxel either belongs
to one or to the other region. This implies that it is unlikely
that the effects observed in the hippocampus are primarily
caused by neuronal activity occurring in the amygdala.
However, because fMRI is an indirect measure of neural ac-
tivity and has limited spatial resolution, our study is unable
to fully rule out the possibility that neurons in posterior
amygdala also contribute partially to the effects observed in
hippocampus.4. Discussion
Optimal weighting of prior expectations against novel sensory
evidence is crucial for efficient inference. How this optimal
weighting is realized in the brain has remained elusive. Our
findings show enhanced hippocampal responses with high ex-
pected and observed variability, conditions in which aparticipant's estimates relymoreonprior expectation thannovel
observations. In addition, though we emphasize that PPI ana-
lyses do not demonstrate directionality of effect, our PPI findings
are consistent with the possibility that enhanced hippocampal
activation attenuates SPC responses to PEs, in other words that
the hippocampus implements a form of optimal weighting to
regulate the response gain of regions processing PEs (i.e., SPC).
At the behavioural level, our study aimed to reveal how the
reliability of observations is established based on expected
and observed variability. This aspect has been neglected by
previous research which mostly focused on the role of the
expected value and its uncertainty. The latter captures how
much a hidden variable (e.g., the fuel amount) is expected to
vary, while here we analysed how much observations (e.g., the
number reported by the gauges) are expected to vary. Our
findings fit the notion that agents evaluate observations as
more reliable when the observed and expected variability are
lower. We found that this reliability of observations was
influential at two distinct levels. Firstly, it determined how
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compared to observations. Secondly, less reliable observations
were associated with more stochastic responses. These find-
ings support optimal inference principles, and extend these to
conditions in which expectations about the variability of ob-
servations aremanipulated. In addition, our results imply that
response stochasticity, which has been neglected in previous
studies, is an important aspect of optimal inference.
Several theoretical proposals have been offered to explain
how the brain performs inference at a neural circuit level
(Knill & Pouget, 2004; Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Friston, 2005; 2010;
Jazayeri, 2008; Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006; O'Reilly,
Schu¨ffelgen, et al., 2013; Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013;
Rao & Ballard, 1999; Vilares et al., 2011; 2012). These theories
debate on which brain regions encode expectations about
variability, and on whether the same regions also encode
variability observed in the data. Our findings shed light on this
issue by showing enhanced hippocampal activity both with
increasing expected and observed variability of upcoming ev-
idence. These empirical findings support proposals wherein a
weighting of expectations relative to observations is realized
within the same brain structures. Another important question
has been whether regions involved in weighting expectations
also reflect a precision-weighted PE (i.e., surprise) signal. Our
results support an anatomical segregation of these signals, as
weighting was implemented in the hippocampus whereas
precision-weighted PEs were signalled in SPC.
The previous literature has also left open the question of
whether areas involved in optimal weighting during inference
are modality-specific or cross-modal, in other words whether
similar brain regions are recruited across different sensory
modalities. While most previous neuroimaging experiments
focused on sensory and perceptual tasks, our study asked
subjects to make inference about an abstract variable. Hence,
our results might be explained by the fact that the hippo-
campus is engaged only during such abstract inference
processes. However, our results are also compatible with the
idea that the hippocampus contributes to optimal weighting
in a modality-independent fashion. Existing evidence favours
the latter explanation as previous neuroimaging studies
employing sensory tasks have shown that hippocampal re-
sponses increase with sensory entropy, a measure analogous
to observed variability in our design (Harrison et al., 2006;
Strange et al., 2005; Tobia et al., 2012).
Our findings indicate that a core function of the hippo-
campus is to establish whether an agent should rely more on
internal representations or external upcoming information. In
contexts such as our inference task, this implies optimising
the weight attributed to expectations over novel evidence.
A similar mechanism can be proposed to explain the critical
role of the hippocampus in memory recollection, a process
wherein agents naturally rely more on internal memory rep-
resentations than new external information (Schacter, Alpert,
Savage, Rauch, & Albert, 1996). Likewise, planning requires a
consideration of internal representations about possible future
states. There is evidence that hippocampal activation increases
with the number and complexity of the representations acti-
vated during planning (Johnson, van der Meer, & Redish, 2007;
Kaplan et al., 2017;Miller, Botvinick,&Brody, 2017; Pezzulo, van
der Meer, Lansink, & Pennartz, 2014), consistent with a viewthat hippocampal activation emphasizes internal representa-
tions, in this case in the form of possible future states. Analo-
gous interpretations can be proposed for mind-wandering,
imagination, and self-projection (Buckner & Carroll, 2007;
Rigoli, Ewbank, Dalgleish, & Calder, 2016; Smallwood, 2013),
in which the hippocampus plays an important role and where
internal representations assume prominence. Moreover, an
influential body of work indicates the hippocampus supports a
form of inference termed pattern completion (Bakker, Kirwan,
Miller, & Stark, 2008; Hasselmo &Wyble, 1997; McNaughton &
Nadel, 1990; Neunuebel & Knierim, 2014; Rolls & Treves,
1998), where partial cues are sufficient to activate a full object
representation. Enhanced hippocampal activity is reported
when an internal representation (e.g., of an object) is evoked by
partial cues (Bakker et al., 2008; Neunuebel & Knierim, 2014).
Pattern completion is analogous to inference under uncer-
tainty in as much as both invoke an integration of prior infor-
mation and sensory evidence. Our findings rise the possibility
that hippocampus implements a weighting of prior expecta-
tions and novel evidencewhichmay also be critical for pattern
completion.
It has been proposed that the hippocampus embodies a
comparator mechanism (Gray &McNaughton, 2003; Kumaran
& Maguire, 2009; Lisman & Otmakhova, 2001; Vinogradova,
2001). This implies a sensitivity of this region to surprising
stimuli, a possibility supported by substantial evidence
(Kumaran &Maguire, 2009). However, at least for simple non-
associative stimuli (associative stimuli may engage different
processes; see Kumaran & Maguire, 2009), previous findings
suggest that the hippocampus responds to surprising events
only early in a task, when learning is engaged (Strange &
Dolan, 2001). For example, it has been observed that odd-ball
stimuli activate this region only during early trials (Strange
& Dolan, 2001). Consistent with this evidence, we found no
hippocampal response to PE in our data. This observation can
be explained by the fact that learning was irrelevant in our
task, given that participants had already played the task
extensively before scanning.
Our data indicate that the relative weight of expectations
over novel evidence is encoded in the anterior hippocampus.
The specific involvement of this portion is consistent with
prior observations that the anterior hippocampus is widely
engaged during novelty, surprise, and uncertainty processing
(e.g., Harrison et al., 2006; Kumaran & Maguire, 2009; Strange
et al., 2005; Tobia et al., 2012).
Our PPI analysis supports the notion the hippocampus
plays a role in modulating the responsivity e or gain e of SPC
to PE. This is consistent with the notion that neural units
involved in weighting prior expectations are segregated from
units encoding PEs, and where the former modulate the
responsivity or postsynaptic gain of the latter (Friston, 2005,
2010; Rao & Ballard, 1999).
A recent theoretical model proposes that the SPC plays a
critical role in encoding surprise, corresponding to a
precision-weighted PE in our study (O'Reilly, Schu¨ffelgen,
et al., 2013). Though previous reports have demonstrated a
relationship between SPC activity and surprise (Strange et al.,
2005; O'Reilly, Schu¨ffelgen, et al., 2013; O'Reilly, Jbabdi, et al.,
2013), they were not in a position to dissociate between PE
and precision-weighted PE. Our study addresses this issue,
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compared to high expected variability, supporting the hy-
pothesis that SPC activity signals a precision-weighted PE.
Previous evidence has also linked activity in SPC to ori-
enting overt and covert attention, especially in relation to
space, but also with dimensions such as time (Coull & Nobre,
1998; Leon& Shadlen, 2003; Mars et al., 2011; Rushworth, Paus,
& Sipila, 2001; Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999). The SPC is also
implicated in processing numbers (Dehane et al., 2003; Pinel,
Dehaene, Riviere, & LeBihan, 2001). This finding has been
interpreted as the brain representing numerical quantities
based on a “numerical line”, which reflects an abstraction
developed from spatial representations (Dehane et al., 2003).
This idea has received empirical support in psychological
studies (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993) and has inspired
the idea that SPC may be involved in orienting attention not
only within space but also within an abstract “numerical line”
(Dehane et al., 2003). It is of interest that, when asked to locate
the middle of a line segment, patients with right parietal le-
sions and unilateral neglect tend to indicate a location further
to the right, consistent with their failure to attend to the left
side of space. In their study, Zorzi, Priftis, and Umilta (2002)
adopted a numerical bisection task where such patients had
to find the middle of two orally presented numbers. Patients
tended to report a number larger than the correct answer, in
other words, on the right of the centre of the “number line”
(e.g., if the two test numbers were 11 and 19, patients may
answer 17). This effect occurred putatively because of a failure
to attend to the left side of the number line e analogous to the
failure seen in the spatial task. This finding supports the
notion that the parietal cortex e and possibly the SPCeis
important in guiding attentional mechanisms underlying
number processing. Within this view, our finding of precision-
weighted PE in SPC can be interpreted as indicating howmuch
within an abstract “numerical line” attention should be shif-
ted from prior expectations.
A large body of evidence has shown that activity in the
striatum of the basal ganglia reflects a reward PE, namely how
much a reward is better than expected (e.g., Glimcher, 2011).
An important question is whether this motivational quantity
is analogous to the notion ofmagnitude PE as conceived in our
study. Crucially, at feedback time, larger distance between
the participants' response and the feedback implies larger
magnitude PE but (as it indexes poor performance and hence
less reward) also smaller reward PE, thus dissociating the two
quantities. Activity in SPC and in striatum was positively and
negatively related with the distance between response and
feedback, respectively. This indicates that reward PE is not
related with the magnitude PE signalled in SPC, and that the
latter is implicated during inference of magnitudes, but un-
related with the motivational consequences elicited by this
inference.
Finally, we acknowledge limitations of our study. At the
behavioural level, our focus was on the actual strategies
adopted by participants during inference. A question that re-
mains open is whether participants are aware of these stra-
tegies, and more generally it remains poorly understood what
participants believe about how they approach inference
problems. At the neural level, the limited spatial resolution of
fMRI limits our ability to explore whether distincthippocampal regions are engaged by expectations about
variability and by variability observed in data. A segregation
might be revealed by more fine-grained methodology in the
future. In addition, due to limited temporal resolution of fMRI,
our results leave open the question of how a hippocampal
response to upcoming evidence evolves in time within a trial.
Another shortcoming is that our PPI analyses cannot
demonstrate directionalities. Thus, although our PPI results fit
with a predictive coding formulation in which the hippo-
campus regulates the gain response in SPC, alternative ex-
planations cannot be fully ruled out.
In summary, our findings help clarifying the behavioural
and neural mechanisms underlying inference under uncer-
tainty. At the behavioural level, we show that the expected
and observed variability establish the reliability of observa-
tions, determining the attractiveness of expectations over
observations and the stochasticity of responses. At the neural
level, our findings highlight that the hippocampus (integrating
both expected and observed variability of upcoming infor-
mation) encodes the weight of prior expectations and modu-
lates responses in SPC to PE (resulting in the expression of a
precision-weighted PE). Together with empirical evidence
from domains such asmemory, planning, and self-projection,
our results support a view that a critical role of hippocampus
is to reflect the relevance of acquired internal representations
compared to upcoming novel evidence.Data availability statement
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the
current study are available from the corresponding author on
reasonable request.
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Appendix
Participants' responses were modelled using a generative
model inspired by Bayesian inference. Participants' estimates
can be characterized by a Bayesianmodel in which a posterior
gauge uncertainty and a posterior value of the true fuel
amount are inferred in two separate steps. During the first
step, the model assumes that the numbers reported by the
two gauges g1 and g2are sampled from a Gaussian distribution
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Using Bayesian belief updating (and setting ag equal to zero
for simplicity), this model can be inverted to estimate the
posterior gauge variance bs2g (the hat symbol indicates esti-
mated parameters):





¼ bg þ VARg (8)
VARg is the observed variance of the gauge distribution, and bg
can be interpreted as an expected variance.
During the second step, the Bayesian model assumes that
the number reporting the true amount of fuel m is sampled
from a Gaussian distribution with known mean m (corre-
sponding to the expected value of 15 or 20) and variance s2 (for
simplicity, this is set to one):
m  N m;s2 (9)
Also at the second step, the model assumes that the two
gauges g1 and g2are sampled from a Gaussian distribution





Using Bayesian belief updating, a posterior estimate of the
fuel amount bm is obtained as follows:
bm ¼ 1bs2g þ 1mg þ
bs2gbs2g þ 1m
¼ 1




bg þ VARg þ 1
!
m (11)
Note the similarity with the model described by equations
(1) and (2). In particular, the ratio 1
bgþVARgþ1 is analogous to the
weight w because like the latter (i) it is a number larger than
zero and smaller than one, (ii) it decreases with the expected
variability (captured by bg in equation 11), (iii) it decreases with
the observed variability (captured by VARg in equation 11), (iv)
it is multiplied by mg, (v) oneminus this ratio is multiplied by m.
From this Bayesian model, one can derive the four empir-
ical predictions we tested. We reasoned that the most con-
servative way to test these predictions empirically would be to
estimate free parameters from participants' behaviour and
performing statistical testing on these. However, the Bayesian
model described by equation (11) has no free parameters.
Hence, we adopted amodel (described by equations (1) and (2))
that retains all the key phenomenological properties but al-
lows one to estimate free parameters e and thus to test the
predictions empirically. Note that, to quantify the observed
variability, the original Bayesian model uses variance (VARg ¼P
ðgxmgÞ2
2 ), while the phenomenological model uses distance
(vg ¼
g1 - g2). The reason is that, in our task, the distribution
of gauge distance across trials was less skewed than thedistribution of gauge variance, meaning that parameter esti-
mates were likely to be more robust if gauge distance and not
gauge variance was used (Fig. S2). However, we emphasize
that the four empirical predictions examined here can be
derived irrespective of whether variance or distance was
considered.
Note that Bayesian belief updating can be formalized also
using precision, which is the inverse of variance:
bm ¼ pg
pg þ 1mg þ
1
pg þ 1m ¼
pg






Where the gauge precision is pg ¼ 1=ðbgþ VARgÞ. This
formulation illustrates the link between precision and un-
certainty (i.e., variance). Equations (11) and (12) allow one to
define a precision-weighted PE based on Bayesian belief
updating (from which we adapted equation (5)):
PEw¼def
 pgpg þ 1

mg  m




For the modelling analyses, free parameters were esti-
mated from each participant's behaviour using fminsearchbnd
function in Matlab. The parameters related to the effect of
expected variability over stochasticity uL and uH were con-
strained to be larger than one, so to guarantee that the SD of
the Gaussian distribution generating the response was posi-
tive. Other parameters were not bounded. During parameter
estimation, the starting value was set to zero for all parame-
ters except for uL and uH for which the starting value was set
to one.Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
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